When writing about history, it is imperative that one deal with facts and that those facts be as accurate as possible. Then and only then can one's historiography be considered with some degree of credence.

Occasionally, letters appear in the newspapers concerning the ongoing debate over compensation to Canadian citizens who suffered unjustly when their properties were confiscated by the government at the start of World War II, and who happened to be of Japanese extraction, the military use of the atomic bomb to end the war in August 1945, and the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. Some readers have even attempted to justify the property confiscation and the atomic bombing, suggesting that Canadian citizens and Japan received just retribution for Pearl Harbor and for wartime treatment of Allied prisoners of war. Sometimes, one is published that contains inaccuracies and cries out for a corrective reply.

One such letter to the Editor of the Toronto Star some years ago dealt with the use of the atomic bomb, and claimed that the Japanese were "warned for days before the attack that a powerful new destructive weapon was to be used against them if they didn't surrender." In fact, Japan was never informed of the existence of the atomic bomb, nor was it ever planned to demonstrate its effects to the Japanese military. The Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945 — essentially an ultimatum — did not mention the atomic bomb. It called upon Japan to surrender unconditionally, adding that "the alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction," but it did not indicate how the "utter destruction" would be accomplished. One should remember that, at that point in history, virtually no one knew of the atomic explosion at Alamogordo and that "prompt and utter destruction" was not an exaggeration but, for the first time in history, meant just what it said.

Second, President Truman's personal assistant and special emissary, Harry Hopkins, discussed with Stalin as early as May 28, 1945 possible Japanese peace feelers, which had been trickling out of the Japanese Embassy in Moscow, from Japan itself, and from neutral Switzerland. Early in July, U.S. officials in Washington knew that Japan wished to end the war. Truman knew of the first Japanese proposal made to the Soviet Union on July 12, 1945; Stalin again brought it to his attention six days later. He also knew about Japan's second peace feeler to the Soviet Union on July 25. British Prime Minister Winston Churchill had been informed of Alamogordo on July 18. Sato, the Japanese ambassador to the Soviet Union, tried until August 8 to get the USSR to mediate an end to the war.

Third, the Yalta agreement of February 11, 1945 promised the USSR its former territories lost to Japan in their war of 1904-05, but only provided that the USSR declare war against Japan within three months of Germany's defeat. Stalin betrayed Japan by refusing to renew the Japan-USSR Neutrality Pact, and sat on Japan's peace feelers to end the war since, if it had ended too soon, Stalin would not have had enough time to carry out his part of the Allied bargain.

Fourth, it is true that the Japanese military wished to continue the war; however, the diplomats wished to terminate it. Unfortunately for Japan, the military prevailed upon Prime Minister Suzuki to issue, on July 28, a statement which effectively condemned Potsdam. In the statement, he used the word mokusatsu, which is close to "refraining from commenting on it at this time," but which Truman chose to interpret as "rejection." Consequently, the first atomic bomb fell on Hiroshima on August 6.

Fifth, due to the resulting confusion, it took the Japanese two days to discover what had happened at Hiroshima, so an official government response was not immediately forthcoming. The Americans interpreted this as intransigence, so the Nagasaki bomb was dropped on the 9th.

Sixth, by June 18, Japan's military defeat by conventional means was assured. One need only read the books of Churchill, U.S. Navy Admirals Ernest J. King, William D. Leahy and Major General Curtis E. LeMay to understand this. Air Force Generals Twining and Arnold concurred. Winston Churchill, regarded by many as one of history's most brilliant strategists and political leaders, wrote that "by the end of July the Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist." Additionally, the Allies enjoyed the freedom of the skies over Japan, "and we bombed Japan actually at will" (General Arnold). Its industry, economy and war-making capacity had been destroyed by early August. Eight million people were homeless. The daily food ration was less than 1500 calories; famine was imminent. Oil stocks were at 7 per cent of what they had been at the war's start.

Churchill wrote in Triumph and Tragedy, "It would be a mistake to suppose that the fate of Japan was settled by the atomic bomb. Her defeat was certain before the first bomb fell, and was brought about by overwhelming maritime power." Surely, this says all that needs to be said on the subject.